Another post in the risk series, this time we review the catastrophic risk failure at White Island, New Zealand, in 2019.
Where is White Island?
White Island—known as Whakaari in te reo Māori—is located in the Bay of Plenty, approximately 48 km off the east coast of New Zealand’s North Island. It is the emergent summit of a larger submarine stratovolcano and represents the country’s most active cone volcano.
Privately owned by the Buttle family, the island was the focus of adventure tourism for decades. Visitors reached it by boat or helicopter for guided walking tours through its steaming crater, often just metres from active vents. Despite its remote and volatile nature, White Island was promoted as a “bucket list” destination—its danger forming part of the attraction.
What Kind of Volcano Is It?
Whakaari is a stratovolcano that has produced frequent phreatic and magmatic eruptions. Its activity is dominated by steam-driven explosions caused by groundwater flash-boiling upon contact with hot rock or magma, ejecting ash, rock, and gas without any visible lava flow.
The volcano’s eruption history includes:
- 1914: A collapse at the crater rim triggered a lahar, killing 10 sulfur miners.
- 1980s–2010s: Frequent minor eruptions, crater lake activity, and gas emissions.
- 2012–2016: Series of explosive events, some damaging monitoring equipment.
- By 2019, the volcano was in a state of persistent low-level unrest, monitored by GNS Science via GeoNet.
What Happened on 9 December 2019?
At 2:11 PM on 9 December 2019, White Island erupted suddenly, without warning. A group of 47 people—including international tourists and local guides—were on or near the crater floor at the time. The eruption was phreatic, ejecting superheated steam, ash, toxic gases, and rock fragments at high velocity.
- 22 people died either immediately or later from burns and respiratory injuries.
- 25 others were injured, many suffering burns to over 80–90% of their bodies.
- The force and suddenness of the eruption meant there was no time to escape or take shelter.
- Rescue efforts were delayed due to the high risk of follow-up eruptions.
Key Failures That Led to the Disaster
The disaster was not just an act of nature—it was the result of several institutional, operational, and regulatory failures. These include:
1. Inadequate Interpretation of Geological Risk
GeoNet had raised the volcanic alert level to Level 2 in the days before the eruption, indicating “moderate to heightened volcanic unrest.” This alert came with increased gas emissions and tremors—but no mandatory closure or suspension of tourism.
Despite this, no effective decision-making framework existed to translate the alert level into a “no-go” decision for tours. Operators and regulators alike treated these alert levels as informational rather than actionable.
2. Regulatory Gaps and Fragmentation
There was no clear statutory authority empowered to shut down tourism on Whakaari during heightened risk periods. Multiple agencies were involved (GNS Science, WorkSafe NZ, Maritime NZ), but no one entity held the mandate or took responsibility for visitor safety decisions.
This diffusion of responsibility left decisions up to individual tour operators—even though many lacked the technical capacity to assess volcanic risk on their own.
3. Inadequate Risk Assessment by Tour Operators
WorkSafe investigations found that key operators had no comprehensive, updated risk assessments, and lacked detailed hazard mitigation plans for phreatic eruptions.
Examples of failure include:
- Tour companies continued operating even with recent increases in gas and tremor activity.
- Visitors were not provided with protective gear (e.g. respirators, fireproof clothing).
- No formal evacuation training or procedures were in place.
- Risk disclosures were minimal or misleading.
4. Commercial Pressures and Normalisation of Risk
Over time, the absence of major incidents despite visible volcanic activity created a false sense of safety—a classic case of the “normalisation of deviance.” Tour operators grew accustomed to operating in high-risk conditions without consequence, leading to complacency.
Moreover, Whakaari tourism was a lucrative business. Thousands of cruise ship passengers visited each year, and the economic incentives to continue operations often overrode caution.
5. Emergency Response Shortcomings
- The rescue delay (approximately 1–2 hours) was partly due to risk to rescuers—but also due to lack of planning for worst-case scenarios.
- There was no real-time monitoring team on the island or contingency plan for rapid evacuation.
Learnings and Changes After the Disaster
The Whakaari eruption forced New Zealand to reassess how it manages high-risk geotourism and natural hazards. Key outcomes include:
- Criminal charges under the Health and Safety at Work Act 2015 were laid against 13 organisations and individuals, including Whakaari Management Ltd and tour companies.
- WorkSafe investigations found that owners and operators breached duties to ensure the health and safety of workers and visitors.
- White Island tours were suspended indefinitely, and the site is now closed to the public.
- Risk levels associated with geotourism have been reclassified, with greater weight given to scientific alert systems and mandatory responses.
- Public and private sector bodies now place a stronger emphasis on independent risk validation, conservative thresholds, and pre-emptive closure policies.
What Are the Broader Risks?
The White Island disaster illustrates the high-consequence nature of phreatic eruptions—sudden, violent, and with no reliable precursors. From a geotechnical perspective:
- Standard monitoring systems often fail to predict phreatic events.
- These eruptions can happen without magma movement, making traditional seismic forecasting tools less effective.
- Tourist sites near volcanic vents, geysers, or hydrothermal systems must be treated with extreme caution.
Summary from a Risk Manager’s Perspective
From a risk management viewpoint, the White Island disaster reveals systemic breakdowns in hazard-to-decision conversion, particularly in adventure tourism:
- Hazard awareness was high, but action thresholds were absent or ignored.
- Responsibility was fragmented, with no one clearly empowered to halt operations.
- Risk assessments were static and failed to adjust to real-time changes in hazard profile.
- Commercial imperatives conflicted with safety imperatives, and there was insufficient oversight to prevent unsafe practices.
Conclusion
White Island was always dangerous. What turned risk into tragedy was not the eruption itself—but the failure to act on clear warning signs, the lack of coordinated governance, and the prioritisation of commercial interests over safety.
The disaster is a stark lesson in what happens when systems treat known risks as tolerable because nothing has gone wrong—yet. In high-risk environments, the absence of past incidents does not mean safety; it simply means luck has held. For risk managers, regulators, and policymakers, Whakaari is a painful reminder that failing to plan for low-probability, high-consequence events is itself a form of negligence.
Northstream Analytic 